5th DCA Motion for Rehearing RE Gregory Taylor Appellant v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

Hot Off The Presses- Taylor Motion For Rehearing

This fresh in from Matt Weidner’s Camp…

As most of you are aware, the opinion that was released in that case was disturbing to say the least because, in my opinion, and that of many other practitioners, the opinion was unclear in several key areas and addressed areas of the law which were not made of at issue in either the trial court or the appellate court briefs.  I believe the restatement of the law and the confusion caused by this lengthy opinion are so great that the a rehearing on the matter or review by another court is absolutely essential.

For those of you who are already confronting this opinion in your trial court practice the attached Motion for Rehearing should provide powerful arguments you need to support the judges who do examine the promissory notes at issues in these cases and who do not agree with the Taylor opinion as it currently stands.

We must all continue this fight and remember that this is not merely a fight over rules or legal technicalities, rather it is a fight for the foundations of our justice system and the heart and soul of this country.

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4closureFraud.org

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Gregory Taylor Appellant v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

Comments
3 Responses to “5th DCA Motion for Rehearing RE Gregory Taylor Appellant v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company”
  1. Will the judges at Florida’s 5th DCA ignore controlling precedent and statutes requiring proof of ownership of the note again?

    How can lower courts overrule higher courts and violate statutes written by the legislature? Is that following the rule of law or a tyrannical abuse of power?

    Why do some judges ignore the law to do favors the rich and powerful? Who is supposed to be able to make sure that judges follow the law?

    Isn’t it a crime for judges to do favors for a party who doesn’t have a legal right to obtain judgment in its favor?

    Isn’t it a crime for judges to violate controlling precedent and statutes?

    Well, let’s see what some higher courts have said:

    “This court is enjoined to follow controlling decisions of the Florida Supreme Court; indeed, the court is powerless to do otherwise.” Regan v. ITT Industrial Credit Co., 469 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) approved, 487 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1986) citing Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973).

    Violation of a right made specific by statutes, rules or controlling precedent is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 which provides criminal penalties for a deprivation of rights under color of law. U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997). Lanier is about a judge being prosecuted.

    If you want to know why judges and regulators can ignore the law to do favors for self-proclaimed connected attorneys, see Why Does the Government Ignore Our Wishes? at http://dailycensored.com/2009/09/11/why-does-the-government-ignore-our-wishes/ and don’t miss my short speech.

    If you take a look, you’ll learn why banksters, their attorneys, regulators, and judges can get away with violating our rights, abusing their power, stealing homes and committing horrible crimes. My article on torture includes a link to the U.S. Supreme Court case which explains how one of our stolen rights makes the difference between justice and injustice, between freedom and slavery.

  2. Kelly A. Greene says:

    Very cogent reply. This should be in the minds of everyone trying to explain, live with Taylor until it can be reversed.

  3. I think the brief misses the point because it does not address the decision. The Appellate Court found that the mortgage was a collateral agreement in which both mortgagor and mortgagee agreed that a third party, MERS, could foreclose. Florida law says that a person other than holder can foreclose under special circumstances. The requirement of such special circumstances were met by the explicit terms of the agreement of the parties to delegate enforcement to a third party. So far, I see no problem. The brief tries to argue a possession requirement; given what the Appellate Court ruled, such an argument is futile.

    The legal problem that should be argued arises when MERS assigns the note to Deutsche Bank. First, can MERS assign its role as a third party enforcer named in the mortgage to another party as successor in interest? The Mortgage is silent on this point. I know of no decisional law on this point. What I do know is that if an agreement between two parties delegates enforcement rights to MERS, it does not delegate those enforcement rights to every Tom, Dick and Harry indiscriminately who may or may not be qualified to discharge the delegated responsibilities.

    Second, Deutsche Bank claims to be the note holder by assignment from MERS. MERS does not have a beneficial interest in the note. How can MERS assign what it does not have? How can Deutsche Bank have what it did not receive?

    Finally, in what capacity is Deutsche Bank acting when it sues as Plaintiff. Is it acting as a third party successor in interest to MERS or as a successor in interest to Franklin, the original noter holder. Failure of the trial court to find in which capacity MERS is acting requires the appellate decision to be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the answer.

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