Comments on: An Open Letter to Judge Meenu Sasser 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida RE: Foreclosure Court

By: indio007

indio007 — Thu, 23 Sep 2010 13:33:18 +0000

When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.

In Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc , criticized the “judicial nature” analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily restrictive. But Rankin’s ultimate result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction.

Some Defendants urge that any act “of a judicial nature” entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum, (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing. Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349.

“Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.” Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)

A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)

Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F2d 59 (C.A. Ariz. 1974)

There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper v. O’Conner, 99 F.2d 133

When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. State use of Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697.

“… the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

“No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it betond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.” Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).

“The courts are not bound by an officer’s interpretation of the law under which he presumes to act.” Hoffsomer v. Hayes, 92 Okla 32, 227 F 417.

By: lisamarie

lisamarie — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 20:40:20 +0000

In reply to stopGOVTwaste. I love it!

By: stopGOVTwaste

stopGOVTwaste — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 19:07:22 +0000

In reply to lisamarie.

SHE’S CRAFTY!

By: lisamarie

lisamarie — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 14:34:22 +0000

I wish every Judge in Florida would take the time to read this. Such a simple matter, follow the law, apply the law.

By: indio007

indio007 — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 13:18:47 +0000

Coram non judice proceedings will not divest one of the lawful possession of title to his property, is a very important rule involving procedure and Caveat emptor as well. Purchasers under execution and judicial sales are charged with knowledge of all the mandatory record shows. They must take notice of nullities or void proceedings but not formal defects or mere irregularities. The former are void ab initio,2′ and of this the nullity is wholly judged by the mandatory record.
The coram non judice proceeding is pregnable to collateral attack. To this it is always vulnerable; time or laches will not cure it.Collateral attack is the last stage of the application of the rule that the general demurrer searches the whole record and attaches to the first substantial fault, likewise of the motion in arrest of judgment. This rule of the general demurrer, the motion in arrest of judgment and of collateral attack is not waivable in character. It involves defects that cannot be waived. It involves grave jurisdictional defects that it is contrary to public policy to waive. The parties named upon the record cannot waive where they cannot contract or stipulate; they cannot dispense with the rule that a court is bound by its record; no court can lawfully proceed unrestrained. A court without a right record and bound thereby is without the pale of the law, and then its proceedings are coram non judice; such proceedings need neither objection nor exception in order to predicate objections thereto in .appellate procedure or elsewhere.1′ The coram non judice proceeding so appearing from the mandatory record is worthless for all purposes. It is a nullity, or a void thing. No title or right can be predicated thereon. It cannot be the basis of any substantive right. But it is otherwise with a merely voidable or erroneous judgment. Rights gained or founded thereon by a third person are substantive rights, and he is viewed as a bona fide purchaser, although the judgment is reversed on a direct attack,on appearance or proceedings in error. In the latter case, however, it is the judgment creditor alone who must account for all benefits and advantages derived from the irregular judgment. After its reversal he is liable upon an action for money had and received; he may be liable in many forms of remedy.
From the foregoing arise many aspects showing the intimacy of what are often called adjective law and substantive law, and which to many appear Inseparable. If so, then there is no such distinction and therefore the “parol evidence rule” may properly be treated with both evidence and contract discussion.2′
If property is sequestered and sold under a coram non judice proceeding no rights whatever are vested or pass thereunder. It now seems that the owner of property may defend it against all claiming under a coram non judice proceeding as he might against an ordinary trespasser.

IF YOU WANT THIS CRAP TO STOP START ATTACKING THE JUDGE”S, THEY ARE ACCOMPLICES TO THE FRAUD AND ARE DENYING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE .
What will happen to the real estate market when there are millions of homes with a clouded title?
A complaint without a competent fact witness with first hand information of the truth is a nullity. Void ab initio. CORAM NON JUDICE. The judge is a trespasser as he has not perform a ministerial duty.

By: Michael

Michael — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 12:45:25 +0000

Great note! Judge Sasser should realize that we’re not against her; the mills are. They’re the one’s pumping garbage into the system and setting her up for an avalanche of reversals. If they’d do their due diligence the case volume in foreclosure court would also substantively decline: the milling process, in its current form, is not only bad law but is also clogging the arteries of the system.

The key is for all judges to remember that
a) foreclosure law in not an administrative process, it is litigation,
b) the banks/mills voluntarily filed and continue to prosecute these cases, nobody is forcing them to stop talking to defendants,
c) the precedents they create can have long-lasting impact for the worse in all aspects of business law, and
d) they’re judges and lawyers; they swore and are obliged to uphold the laws of civil procedure and independence of the judiciary.