“Indeed, it appears as though many loans and other mortgage-related assets have been double and even triple-pledged to various constituencies“


In my 1999 21st Century Loan Sharks Report, I coined and defined the term “Predatory Mortgage Securitization” (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predatory_mortgage_securitization)  in my report from MY PERSONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS I DEFINED SOME THE FOLLOWING PRACTICES THAT DEFINED Predatory Mortgage Securitization….

  • Securitizations that are termed and classified as “whole loan” and “true” sales “without recourse” that are really financing mechanisms with undocumented side deals and agreements for recourse which may not be able to be classified as investments in real estate and may have tax and reporting consequences for purchasers;
  • Stamping, filing and recording loan and mortgage instruments that indicate loan was sold “without recourse” when in fact there were recourse provisions;
  • Failing to record in country records the true and real ownership, assignment and endorsements of promissory notes, deeds and other mortgage documents which were part of sale, assignment or transfer;
  • Knowingly accepting via computer tapes the principal balances of loans offered for securitization when the servicers, investment bank or securitizer has knowledge that problems or potential fraud existed in the servicing operation of the bank, servicer, broker originating, selling, assigning or transferring the loan;
  • Knowingly accepting via computer tapes the principal balances of loans offered for securitization when the servicers, investment bank or securitizer has knowledge that problems or potential fraud existed in the servicing operation of the bank, servicer, broker originating, selling, assigning or transferring the loan and the new owners, servicer and assignee securitizing the loan pool does not possess the full and complete loan transaction histories for each borrower;
  • Knowingly accepting loans and not disclosing to investors problems with loan documentation; missing, altered or fraudulent documentation in loan file; chain of titles and ownership; threatened legal actions; current regulatory actions or complaints made about loans assigned;
  • Reporting problems or improper custody, maintenance and control of promissory notes, deeds and other loan documents;
  • Offering for sale and securitization interests in notes, deeds or other mortgage instruments that the servicer or securitizer does not have a real interest in;
  • Offering for sale and securitization interests in notes, deeds or other mortgage instruments that the servicer or securitizer does not have in their custody or control;
  • Offering for sale and securitization interests in notes, deeds or other mortgage instruments that the servicer or securitizer has offered for sale to someone else;
  • Offering for sale and securitization interests in notes, deeds or other mortgage instruments that the servicer or securitizer is owned by someone other than party identified in the prospectus;
In essence on thousands of occasions I stated to regulators, CEOS, banks, Fannie and Freddie that the practices of the banks were that they were double and multi-pledging assets and pledging paid off and refinance notes to securitizations.  This is something April, Max and I have discussed for years now.  Now, they come and admit that each of my allegations were true  Without analyzing the deal, as complex as they are, you WILL NEVER KNOW IF THE FORECLOSING PARTY HAS “ANY” RIGHT TO FORECLOSE!!!
The motives I identified for the “Blank Endorsements” and missing assignments and “pre-notarized” “Blank Assignments” and “Blank Allonges” that “were placed into the “custodial/collateral” files were to be able to:
Multi-pledge collateral (Notes) so as to cook the books;
In case of bankruptcy, allow the entity in possession of the notes to simply transfer to another entity to be decided or themselves the notes etc… so as to keep out of the bankruptcy estate of the bankrupt creditor;
To pretend to show that a “true sale” occurred when in reality the so-called lenders were financing their receivables;
Complete and change chains in titles to notes that were toxic where fraud was known and HDC could be achieved;
Shuffle the ball (note) under the shell (owner) so as to subvert TILA, RESPA, and FDCPA claims and other lawsuit claims and any related HDC and assignee liability issues.
Now, in BOA’s Motion in the TBW case, they prove my allegations that the notes were multi-pledged and my statement for years that unless you see where each note comes on and off the books, and review the custodial documents, you will NEVER KNOW WHO OWNS THE NOTE and has any right to accelerate, amend, modify, settle, payoff, satisfy, return, and cancel the note, let alone authority or standing to foreclose.

Here is the key part from the motion….

On numerous occasions, the Debtor has informed the Court and other parties in interest that one of the biggest challenges in this case will be sorting out the competing claims to cash and other assets that flowed through the Debtor’s accounts prior to the bankruptcy filing. Indeed, it appears as though many loans and other mortgage-related assets have been double and even triple-pledged to various constituencies. According to the Debtor, the largest single source of disputed funds—more than $548 million according to the Debtor’s Second Interim Reconciliation Report—relates to Freddie Mac. Indeed, BofA believes that there were improper diversions of Ocala loans and assets from TBW to Freddie Mac, and Ocala may have valid ownership claims with respect to a substantial portion of assets that relate to Freddie Mac. Accordingly, there can be little doubt that BofA, in its representative capacities with respect to Ocala, has a valid and pressing need for information regarding Freddie Mac’s extensive relationship with the Debtor, which is directly relevant and necessary to evaluate the Debtor’s property, liabilities, and financial condition. In just a few weeks, the Debtor intends to file an Asset Reconciliation Report that will identify with greater specificity (but, importantly, not resolve) the remaining issues with respect to ownership rights. As a result, the need for BofA to gain access to documents in Freddie Mac’s possession has become particularly urgent. Among other things, BofA needs to obtain documents from and examine witnesses at Freddie Mac to (1) evaluate competing claims against the estate, (2) test the assumptions contained in the Asset Reconciliation Report, and (3) examine Freddie Mac’s claim of ownership with respect to certain mortgage assets and its custodial arrangements with Colonial Bank for those assets. Despite these time sensitivities, Freddie Mac has so far blocked BofA’s ability to obtain any of this information, including those documents that have already been produced to the Debtor and counsel for the Committee. In its objection, Freddie Mac goes to great lengths to characterize the BofA 2004 Motion as overly burdensome, massively expensive, improperly motivated, and generally disruptive to the ongoing discovery between the Debtor and Freddie Mac. Even if such arguments had any merit under the circumstances (which they do not), the simple fact remains: nearly three months after the Court entered its order on the Debtor’s Rule 2004 motion authorizing and directing examination of Freddie Mac, BofA has not been able to review a single document…

Nye Lavalle

Be sure to sift through the files below… Fascinating…
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4closureFraud.org

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Freddie Objection to Boa in Re Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp.

Boa Answer to Freddie Objection in Re Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp.