Citi Tried to Pass Off Madoff Exposure
Citigroup Inc tried to pass on its exposure to Bernard Madoff to other banks just months before his epic fraud was revealed, the Madoff trustee said in a lawsuit accusing a second major U.S. bank of unsavory dealings with the financier.
Trustee Irving Picard said red flags about Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC were apparent to Citi as early as 2005, according to court papers unsealed on Monday. The lawsuit seeks $425 million from the bank.
From the unsealed complaint…
Irving Picard,
Trustee for the Liquidation of
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
v
Citibank and Citigroup
Global Markets Limited
Armed with public and considerable non-public information about Madoff, Citi knew or should have known of possible fraud at Madoff’s investment advisory business.
Leverage And The Madoff Ponzi Scheme
The Madoff Feeder Funds wanted to use leverage to increase the amount of assets invested through Madoff, increasing their management and performance fees. They found eager leverage-provider partners in large financial institutions, like Citi, who created any number of lending and alternative investment products designed for the same purpose – to exploit Madoff’s “success” for their own institutional gains.
The Citi Loan
In 2005, a Citi entity2 made a loan of $300 million to a Madoff Feeder Fund called Rye Select Broad Market Prime Fund, L.P. (“Prime Fund”). Virtually all of Prime Fund’s assets were invested through BLMIS.
In connection with the Prime Fund transaction, Citibank lent $300 million to Prime Fund to invest directly into BLMIS. Later, as Citi became more suspect of Madoff’s legitimacy, Citi backed out of a proposal to provide leverage to a newly-created fund
Shortly thereafter, Citibank also refused to increase the amount of the existing Prime Fund loan, and ultimately cancelled the Citibank-Prime Fund
lending relationship, demanding full repayment of the $300 million loan. To repay the loan to Citibank, Prime Fund withdrew and/or utilized more than $300 million from its BLMIS account and then subsequently transferred those funds to Citibank. That money is Customer Property and should be returned to the BLMIS estate.The Citi Swap
In 2005, CGML entered into a swap transaction for approximately $280 million with a Swiss-based hedge fund known as Auriga International Limited (“Auriga”). The
underlying asset for this swap was Sentry. As part of this swap transaction, CGML purchased $140 million of Sentry shares, and held a total of approximately $280 million of Sentry shares at various points in time between 2005 and 2008. In the months prior to Madoff’s arrest in 2008, CGML redeemed approximately $130 million of its Sentry shares on notice of red flags concerning Madoff’s very legitimacy.CGML submitted its Sentry redemptions and received multi-million dollar transfers of money from Sentry at times when Citi not only knew or should have known about major red flags of possible fraudulent activity by Madoff, but in fact had been advised specifically that Madoff was likely running a massive Ponzi scheme.
CITI WAS ON INQUIRY NOTICE OF POSSIBLE MADOFF FRAUD
Citi had access to and received information placing it on inquiry notice that Madoff’s advisory business was potentially a fraud, and/or that Madoff was making hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in avoidable transfers.
Citi’s “Due Diligence” And Early Discovery Of The Risks Of Possible Fraud
During the course of Citi’s 2005 initial “due diligence,” and as part of negotiating the final terms of the Prime Fund loan transaction, Citi learned, among other things, that Tremont received only paper copy trade confirmations approximately five (5) days after BLMIS conducted the alleged trading – a practice rife with the possibility for fraud due to the ability of the brokerage firm to backdate or manufacture trading activity with no ability on the customer’s part to check that the trades actually took place.
Citi Sought An Indemnity Against Madoff Fraud In The Agreement Because Madoff’s Control Over The Trading And Custody Of Assets Was Unchecked
As part of its pre-agreement due diligence, Citi flagged a key indicator of fraud: “[b]ecause the Investment Advisor [Madoff] has full discretion over the Brokerage Account [Prime Fund’s account at BLMIS], the potential risk, while remote, of fraud by the Investment Advisor is introduced.” In the same document, dated May 31, 2005, an entire paragraph is devoted to what is titled “Fraud by the Investment Advisor due to physical control of the Brokerage Account and full discretion over account activity.”
The Terms Of The Prime Fund Loan
Under the Prime Fund Loan’s terms and conditions, Tremont was obligated to provide CNAI and Citibank with weekly and monthly reports of Madoff’s purported trading activity on behalf of Prime Fund. Upon information and belief, Prime Fund and Tremont provided this information to Citi. Because of the anomalies apparent on the face of these reports, or which could be discovered upon reasonable review and analysis, this information placed Citi on inquiry notice of fraudulent activity and/or fraud in connection with hundreds of millions of
dollars of avoidable transfers being made by BLMIS.ATTEMPTS TO FURTHER EXPLOIT MADOFF’S RETURNS THROUGH TREMONT – CITI’S CONCERNS DEEPEN
In or about January 2006, Tremont and several individuals at Citi began discussing possible transactions whereby Citibank or CNAI would provide two or three times leverage for either a single Tremont-sponsored BLMIS feeder fund, or two distinct Tremont- sponsored BLMIS feeder funds with a single share class each.
CITI’S “DILIGENCE”
With Citi having already executed nearly half a billion dollars worth of Madoff- related financial products, it was, upon information and belief, not until March 2006 that Citi first asked Sentry whether BLMIS’s mysterious (and ultimately non-existent) option contracts were done over-the-counter or on a listed exchange. CGML also asked if FGG could “tell us one to two names of the counterparties with which the option trades have been done.”
According to , Citi was repeatedly told that Madoff refused to identify the options counterparties, and that Citi was never satisfied in terms of its questions concerning BLMIS’s options trading. According to , Citi did nothing more to attempt to independently identify options counterparties for BLMIS or the Madoff Feeder Funds. Additionally, FGG never provided Citi with copies of options confirmations received from BLMIS. In fact, FGG provided Citi with only one binder of trade confirmations during the April meeting with FGG, and the Citi representatives were not allowed by FGG to take the binder with them.
Citi was in a unique position to discover Madoff’s fraud by virtue of its Information Agreement with Sentry, giving Citi access to a wide array of information not otherwise publicly available. Citi also had considerable non-public information about BLMIS to Citi should have led any reasonable investor in Citi’s position to discover numerous red flags of possible fraud involving BLMIS.
Upon information and belief, during 2007 and 2008, it became increasingly clear that CGML was no longer comfortable with its overall Madoff exposure, including its swap with Auriga. In an internal FGG e-mail about potential sources for new structured products, Vijayvergiya stated he “heard about a year ago that unless they could meet BLM, Citi’s risk group probably wouldn’t approve increasing their exposure.”
CITI TERMINATES THE AURIGA SWAP
Upon information and belief, by September 2008, CGML also began reaching out to other banks to take over its remaining exposure to BLMIS. In one e-mail, a CGML trader said, “We’re needing to terminate our Madoff trade. Do you have appetite for that risk over there?” to which the other bank responded, “don’t think so, madoff is not very popular here either.”
CITI WAS SPECIFICALLY TOLD MADOFF WAS RUNNING A PONZI SCHEME
By no later than June 2007, and likely several years earlier, Citi had knowledge of the possibility of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
Upon information and belief, “redacted” had the opportunity to meet and befriend Harry Markopolos, a fellow member of the financial industry. Markopolos is a certified financial analyst who, for many years, had been exclaiming that Madoff was most likely operating a Ponzi scheme and that BLMIS’s investment advisory business was a complete fraud.
Markopolos reached out directly to “redacted” via e-mail in June 2007, informing “redacted” of Markopolos’s suspicions regarding an unspecified leveraged swap that provided exposure to Madoff. Markopolos made his suspicions regarding Madoff remarkably clear stating, “[w]e all know how Ponzi schemes turn out.” Upon information and belief, Markopolos and “redacted” had additional oral and written communications before December 10, 2008, in which Madoff’s fraud was specifically discussed.
Years before the collapse of BLMIS, and before the June 2007 email, “redacted” met with Markopolos at Citi’s New York offices. During that visit, Markopolos showed “redacted” a description of Madoff’s SSC Strategy and historical returns generated by that trading strategy as reported by a Madoff Feeder Fund, which, upon information and belief, was Sentry.
Markopolos asked “redacted” whether the strategy that was described could result in the returns claimed. Within minutes, “redacted” concluded that Madoff’s strategy as described could not generate the returns indicated by the Madoff Feeder Fund. “redacted” attempted to reconcile the discrepancy he saw between the strategy as described and the returns supposedly generated by the strategy, but could not resolve the discrepancy. “redacted” quickly concluded that the claimed returns were not in fact generated by the Madoff strategy as described. “redacted” relayed his conclusion to Markopolos that same day.
“redacted” and Markopolos also discussed whether others at Citi were familiar with Madoff trading in the equity and options markets. That same day, before Markopolos left Citi’s offices in New York, “redacted” asked around various desks at Citi and quickly determined that no trader at Citi on the index trading desk was trading options with BLMIS, nor were they aware of BLMIS trading OEX options. “redacted” also asked salespeople at Citi if they knew BLMIS as a customer or as someone who is active in the market, to which the salespeople told “redacted” “no.”
Citi willfully turned a blind eye to indicia of possible fraud at BLMIS based upon information available to them. Citi knew, and was on notice of, irregularities and problems concerning the trades reported by BLMIS, and strategically chose to ignore these concerns in order to continue to enrich themselves.
CITI EXECUTIVES ALSO KNEW MADOFF HAD BEEN BLACKLISTED
Upon information and belief, Citi learned more red flag information placing it on inquiry notice that Madoff was making fraudulent transfers when “redacted” became its “redacted”
in or around March 2008. Prior to joining Citi, “redacted” “redacted” a multi-strategy hedge fund which was acquired by Citigroup in 2007.COUNT ONE:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 550(a), AND 551
Against Citibank and CNAICOUNT TWO:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B), 550(a), AND 551
Against Citibank and CNAICOUNT THREE:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 276, 276-a, 278
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against Citibank and CNAICOUNT FOUR:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 273 AND 278
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against Citibank and CNAICOUNT FIVE:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 274, 278,
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against Citibank and CNAICOUNT SIX:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 275, 278,
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against Citibank and CNAICOUNT SEVEN:
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550(a), AND 551
Against CGMLCOUNT EIGHT:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 550(a), AND 551
Against CGMLCOUNT NINE:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B), 550(a), AND 551
Against CGMLCOUNT TEN:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 276, 276-a, 278
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against CGMLCOUNT ELEVEN:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 273 AND 278
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against CGMLCOUNT TWELVE:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 274, 278,
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against CGMLCOUNT THIRTEEN:
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS (SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE)
NEW YORK DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §§ 275, 278,
AND/OR 279, AND 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550(a), AND 551
Against CGML
Full complaint below…
Quite interesting if you are into reading these kinds of things…
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4closureFraud.org
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